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1 Banking and Finance Seminar, Smurfit School, University College Dublin, 18 November 
2010.  I am grateful to Mary Lambkin and to Desmond Norton for allowing me to cite 
unpublished material in their possession.  The citations from the court of directors of the 
Bank of Ireland are taken from that bank’s archives.  The talk builds on Ó Gráda (2002).   2
THE LAST MAJOR IRISH BANK FAILURE 
 
  Irish joint stock banking as we knew it until recently dates from 1825. The 
initial flurry of entrants—the Provincial, Hibernian, Belfast, and Northern Banks in 
the 1820s, followed by the National Bank and the Agricultural and Commercial Bank 
in 1834 and the Ulster and the Royal in 1836—ended in 1838 with the foundation of 
the ill-fated Tipperary Bank. That period has been seen as the closest Ireland ever 
came to free banking.  For two decades there was free entry, unrestricted note 
issue [subject to the gold standard, and setting aside the Bank of Ireland’s 
remaining note-issuing monopoly within 50 Irish miles of Dublin], and no central 
bank.
2 
But there was quite an interval between the formation of the Tipperary Bank 
and that of the Munster Bank in 1864.  The new kid on the block made quite an 
impression and, indeed, thrived for a time.  Although resolutely regional in 
ambitions and ethos, by the 1870s it held 7-8 per cent of all Irish bank deposits, a 
share it maintained till the end (Figure 1).  But it crashed sensationally in 1885.   
The Munster Bank began as the National Investment Company in 1864, a 
vehicle whereby a group of Cork businessmen envisaged mopping up savings and 
investing them in local projects, mainly related to real estate.  As Tony Lambkin 
has pointed out, such ventures were the flavour of the day in 1864.  The 
International Financial Society, the Land Securities Company, the General 
International Agency, and the Alliance National Land, Building, and Investment 
Company were advertised heavily in the national and Cork press.  Most likely, these 
                                                 
2 For more on the banking background see Ó Gráda (1994: 349-65).   3
were a slightly delayed response to the joint stock company legislation of 1856 and 
1862.  The coterie of Cork businessmen behind the scheme included Nicholas 
Murphy, James Murphy, and former mayor James Lambkin, but the main impetus 
behind the move was undoubtedly Tyrone-born William Shaw (1823-1895), who had 
first moved to Cork as a Congregational minister but soon switched to immersing 
himself in the commercial life of the city.  He would eventually become an M.P., 
and very briefly (between Butt and Parnell) leader of the Home Rule party. 
For some time before then, John Francis Maguire, founder of the Cork 
Examiner in 1841, had been arguing that Irish economic development was hindered 
by an inadequate banking system.  Ireland—and Munster—needed ‘liberal’ rather 
than ‘discouraging’ banks, whereby, as in Scotland, ‘the enterprising manufacturer 
is fostered and encouraged’ (cited in Lambkin, p. 7).  Yet the bank’s initial 
prospectus hardly reflected such sentiments.  It focused on making advances on 
land, buildings, freights and merchandise, ‘as well as villa residences’ and the like, 
and purchasing and leasing sites in the Cork area.  
  Over the summer of 1864, the initial strategy of attracting funds for the 
purchase of real estate broadened into one of seeking investments in ‘bottomry’ 
(laden ships bound for or temporarily held in home ports) and receiving deposits at 
interest.  In August ‘a large and influential meeting of shareholders’ agreed that 
the new company combine banking and investment operations, and in mid-October 
the new project changed its name to the Munster Bank, determined to ‘open 
current accounts, discount bills, and transact the ordinary business of banking’ 
(Lambkin, p. 13).   4
The Munster Bank was built largely on Cork capital, although by the early 
1880s half or more of its shareholders lived outside Munster.  And although it 
concentrated its business on the province of Munster, its branch in Dublin’s Dame 
Street was its second busiest.  It developed quite an extensive branch network, 
venturing where no joint stock bank had ventured before, into small towns and 
even villages.  A high proportion of its branches were located in insignificant small 
towns and villages (see Figure 2).  At the time of its failure it had branches in 
places such as Kildysart, Hospital, Dunlavin, Kilfinane, and Tarbert—all with 
populations of less than a thousand in 1881.  It also opened branches in places 
where there was already the branch of another bank, and it provoked rival banks 
into extending their networks.  How profitable some of these branches were is hard 
to say, but Tarbert and Hospital are unlikely to have had more than a hundred 
depositors, and several others would have had less than two hundred.
3   
  The Munster Bank also sought the business of people who probably had not 
banked much previously.  As the chairman put it to his shareholders in January 
1877, when the bank was riding high: 
 
                                                 
3 Estimated by applying a solution to the tank number problem to lists of Munster Bank 
depositors with dividend payments still unclaimed three years after the bank closed its 
doors. During World War II both Allied and German intelligence sought to infer enemy 
weapons production from serial numbers on captured materiel.  Suppose the tank 
population is 1, 2, 3, ..., N, where N is unknown.  The problem then is to estimate N from a 
random sample of X1, X2, X3,..., Xn, of size n.  There are several plausible estimates of N 
but the ‘best’ (in the sense of being unbiased and minimum variance) turns out to be 
[(n+1)/n] Xn (Ó Gráda 2002). 
   5
He could take him any day he pleased to a country branch and show 
him a sheaf of bills it would take him some time to count and those 
bills would be for sums ranging from £10 to £50 or £60 and up to £100 
and a great many of these bills had the drawers’ marks on them for in 
many instances they could not sign their names.  But they were all 
farmers.  It was a usual thing to have many of these bills unpaid when 
due… 
 
  The Munster Bank built up business partly by paying a generous return on 
deposits, just as the Tipperary Bank had done.  It rattled its rivals, but the extra 
competition was all to the good.  The Bank of Ireland, which had been lax about 
expanding its branch network, responded by creating branches in Clonakilty and 
Listowel in 1870, and in Charleville, Midleton, Skibbereen, and Mallow in 1876-77.   
This greatly irritated the Munster Bank, but it should be noted that Bank of Ireland 
had responded in exactly the same way in 1825 (in the wake of the creation of the 
Provincial Bank) when it opened seven new branches, and in 1834-6 (after the 
foundation of the National Bank) when it opened ten more.  Another grievance of 
the Munster Bank is that it operated at the disadvantage of being a non-note issuing 
bank, something it tried to remedy without avail in the 1870s. 
  The Munster’s collapse on July 15 1885 was headline news, and not only in 
Ireland.  It was not the first, but it was the last Irish bank of the first rank to fail—
that is, until the very recent past. 
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THREE BACKGROUND CONCEPTS: 
  Three theoretical concepts in the monetary and banking literature help 
contextualize and motivate this account of the collapse of the Munster Bank in July 
1885. 
  [1] The first is what we might term, after Naomi Lamoureaux, insider 
lending.  Lamoureaux (formerly of UCLA, now of Yale) describes in her classic 
Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic Development in 
Industrial New England (CUP 1994) how in the northeastern US in the early 
nineteenth century bankers routinely lent a large part of their funds to themselves 
and to fellow directors and their friends.  Indeed starting off in business might 
mean setting up a bank in order to raise the capital.  This worked quite well until 
with the development of alternative ways of raising venture capital, such 
businessmen found it easier to raise capital through other channels.  Lamoreaux 
shows that where capital markets are thin, this form of bank could work, and her 
analysis attracted a lot of praise from U.S. economic historians. 
  But how does this square with another tendency in the literature, well 
reflected in the title of William Black’s recent The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to 
Own One (Texas, 2005)?  The theoretical antecedent of Black’s work is George 
Akerlof and Paul Romer’s ‘Looting: the economic underworld of bankruptcy for 
profit’ (1993), which argued: 
Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or 
low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves 
more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt   8
obligations. Bankruptcy for profit occurs most commonly when a 
government guarantees a firm's debt obligations. 
 
  A more recent contribution in this same tradition is La Porta et al., ‘Related 
lending’ (2003).  They argue, very much in the spirit of Lamoreaux, that ‘bankers 
know more about related borrowers than unrelated ones because they are 
represented on the borrower’s board of directors and share the day-today 
management of the borrower’ (La Porta et al., 2003, 231). Providing credit to 
insiders therefore could help to mitigate both adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems that occur when information costs are high.  However, what they call a 
competing ‘looting’ hypothesis holds ‘that close ties between banks and borrowers 
allow insiders to divert resources from depositors and/or minority shareholders to 
themselves’ (La Porta et al., 2003, 231). 
  They measure these opposing presumptions against data from contemporary 
Mexico, and find that related lending is common (20 percent of commercial loans) 
and involves favourable rates of interest to the borrower than lending to others 
(interest demanded considerably lower). However, related loans are 33 percent 
more likely to default and, when they do, have lower recovery rates (30 percent 
less) than unrelated ones. So the evidence for Mexico in the 1990s supports the 
view related lending is a form of looting.   
  Yet another paper in this area is Maurer and Haber (2007).  They argue that 
related lending has negative outcomes compared to a first-best world of 
functioning capital markets, in which the allocation of capital would be less 
personal and therefore more efficient.  But if the risk of default is very high and   9
property rights insecure, then related lending may be optimal in the circumstances.  
In other words, it can be seen as the endogenous result of weak property rights and 
costly informational asymmetries.  So related lending is a second-best solution, 
perfectly sensible in a world of banking systems that don’t engage in lending for 
productive purposes. 
  [2] The second background concept is the idea of lender of last resort, which 
dates back to English merchant banker Francis Baring’s reference to ‘dernier resort’ 
in his Observations on the Establishment of the Bank of England and on the Paper 
Circulation of the Country [1797].  The idea received its mature, classic 
articulation in Henry Thornton’s Paper Credit of GB [1802] and in Walter Bagehot’s 
Lombard Street [1873].  Both were practicing bankers.  Thornton’s fear was that ‘If 
any bank fails, a general run upon the neighbouring banks is apt to take place, 
which if not checked in the beginning by a pouring into the circulation of a very 
large quantity of gold, leads to very extensive mischief’ (Thornton, 1802: 182).  And 
the solution: ‘If the Bank of England, in future seasons of alarm, should be disposed 
to extend its discounts in a greater degree than heretofore, then the threatened 
calamity may be averted.’  So the important thing here is fear of contagion. 
  Bagehot’s work was partly in response to the failure of Overend Gurney, a 
wholesale discount bank, in May 1866 with liabilities of over £10 million, a failure 
which had serious ramifications for the banking system and the British economy 
more generally. 
  The Bank of England decided in its wisdom that Overend Gurney was beyond 
redemption.  Letting it go would cause some panic, but that was a price to pay.    10
The panic could be alleviated through monetary easing.  Gladstone agreed to allow 
the Bank to increase the amount of money in circulation, subject to the stipulation 
that bank rate be raised to 10 per cent, while letting Overend Gurney sink.  The 
crisis did not last long. 
  The Overend Gurney crisis had repercussions in Ireland, however.  La 
Touche’s Bank requested an overdraft of £50,000 of the Bank of Ireland; The Royal 
Bank and the Hibernian Bank asked for £50,000 each, and the Munster Bank for 
£30,000.  The Union Bank of Ireland was a casualty; its branches were sold off to 
the Munster Bank and the Hibernian Bank before it went into voluntary liquidation. 
The depositors got their money back eventually.  Shareholders who had been 
induced to part with more of their cash not long before the end—and at a time 
when the directors knew the writing was on the wall—lost the lot.   
  The ‘Bagehot Principle’ has become part of monetary orthodoxy.  But some 
critics have objected that the presence of a lender of last resort creates moral 
hazard; this is the line taken by Hugh Rockoff (1986) and Lawrence White (1984). 
  In the Irish case, during its first century the Bank of Ireland often played the 
role of lender of last resort, especially in 1826, 1836, 1847, 1857, and 1866.  The 
crisis of 1836 is worth dwelling on briefly, since it was due to the failure of another 
bank, the Agricultural and Commercial Bank.  That bank had been founded in 1834 
with headquarters in Nenagh (outside the Bank of Ireland’s zone) so that it could 
issue banknotes.  Overambitious and poorly managed the Agricultural and 
Commercial closed its doors on 14
 November 1836.  Prior to then all major banks 
had been forced to seek help at the Bank of Ireland, and the total advanced by it   11
during the crisis came to nearly £0.5 million.  Even the Agricultural Bank got help to 
the tune of £24,000 but on 12 November the Court agreed to provide no further 
accommodation despite pleas from the Lord Mayor of Dublin and others.  The Bank 
of England also refused to help the Agricultural.  In the end the crisis was short-
lived and good for the reputation of the surviving banks. 
  [3] The third bankground concept is taken from Charles Goodhart’s The 
Evolution of Central Banks. Goodhart proposed that central banks evolve naturally 
because they fulfil a natural function.  Their role as lender of last resort has macro 
or systemic ramifications.  The private bank that doubles up as a quasi-central 
bank, to which other banks look up and resort when they are in trouble, faces a 
conflict of interests between its public service and commercial roles.  This would 
seem to have applied to the Bank of Ireland, acknowledged lender of last resort to 
the other Irish banks, but also a commercial rival.  It must choose eventually one 
route or the other.  The Bank of England became a public institution, the Bank of 
Ireland a commercial bank. 
 
 
TROUBLE ON THE HORIZON: 
 The  monthly  Irish Banker began sounding the alarm from 1877 on.  In 
February 1877 it noted a sharp fall in the bank’s liquidity position; in August 1878 it 
claimed that the bank should be holding about twice its then amount of convertible 
securities, and it was critical again in January 1880.  In March 1881 the Irish Banker   12
sounded a more reassuring note about liquidity, but it ceased publication before 
the Munster’s situation became really critical. 
  There are signs that some directors were beginning worry about how the 
bank was run from 1878 on.  The bank was in effect being run by Shaw, manager 
James Belton, and co-director Nicholas Murphy.  At the January 1879 shareholders 
meeting—following disclosure of some bad debts—Shaw promised that ‘in future the 
entire business of the Bank must be under the control of the entire Board’. 
‘Therefore’, he continued, ‘I have insisted that the Board should be associated with 
me in the daily investigation of any business in Cork that requires investigation…’ 
(Lambkin, p. 59). 
  Rumours regarding directors’ borrowings had been circulating since 1881.  At 
the shareholders’ meeting of 25 Jan 1883 Shaw referred to them as follows:   
 
The statements are, I believe, that some of the Directors are largely 
overdrawing their accounts without security and that the Bank is in 
a very serious position now with those Directors.  I now assure you 
here publicly that there is not the slightest foundation for any such 
statement…I have stood here without thinking of remuneration for 
myself for 19 years now and I have never been  absent from any 
Bank meetings save one.’ 
 
  Shareholders’ meetings from 1883 on were tense or stormy affairs.  At the 
July 1883 meeting Shaw acknowledged the existence a group of Dublin-based 
shareholders led by Sir Robert Jackson, Thomas Fitzgerald C.E., John McSheehy 
(law agent to Dublin corporation), and Hugh Tarpey J.P., long-time member of   13
Dublin corporation and Lord Mayor in 1877-78.  These extremely well-connected, 
well-heeled, and influential gentlemen were very unhappy with how the bank was 
being run.  Their main worry was the fear that directors had been breaching the 
rule (which had stood since 1866) that no loans be made to directors except on 
adequate security.  
  Unhappily for the Cork directors, the Jackson group persuaded two directors 
not based in Cork, Edmund Dease and Robert La Touche, to assess the situation, 
and in July 1883 these two reported their unhappiness with the securities for 
several directors’ overdrafts to McSheehy and Fitzgerald.  Dease and La Touche 
seem to have been ‘outsiders’ on the Munster’s board, and so not privy to 
everything that was going on. Subsequent investigation by shareholders’ 
representatives suggested that ‘sums to a very large amount’ had been lent to 
directors on inadequate security.  
  Then on 7 November 1883 Tarpey in Dublin received a letter from J. H. 
Belton in Cork, stating that the Munster’s directors intended to seek an amendment 
to the clause prohibiting insider lending on personal security only. The draft 
amendment proposed that such loans not be granted ‘unless the Board, without a 
division, by an entry in their minutes sanction such advance or credit’. Belton’s 
brazen move outraged the Dublin shareholders. They sought an injunction against 
the bank in the court of vice-chancellor Hedges Eyre Chatterton.  They were 
successful in this immediate objective and obtained an order preventing the 
proposal of a resolution repealing an article forbidding ‘that Directors of the Bank   14
or firms in which Directors were interested should receive advances or be permitted 
to draw on overdrafts without lodging full and sufficient securities’ (p. 67). 
  The January 1884 meeting of shareholders meeting attracted a huge 
attendance of 250 and lasted four hours.  Shaw acknowledged that they would not 
go ahead with the proposed change regarding Directors’ loans, adding:  
 
He might say for himself that his account was perfectly well secured 
and that of any concern with which he was connected was also 
perfectly secured.  His property was pretty well known and where it 
was—he could not walk away. 
 
  And Shaw added, in faux valedictory mood: 
 
I fell into the way of doing everything in the outside world in the 
way of working the Bank and the establishment of branches and in 
the purchasing of business.  I was constantly employed and probably 
the thing could not have grown if there was anything like division or 
a divided council.  Having existed for 20 years I think now it would 
be unwise for the Bank to continue in this one-man system.  I now 
believe that the very best thing for the Bank…will be that I should 
retire and allow the Directors generally to take a more active part 
in the management of the Bank. 
 
  The Dublin shareholders had placed three demands before the meeting.  
First, they sought the removal of the bank’s manager in Cork, J. H. Belton, from 
the board.  Second, they sought an appointment of additional professional auditor 
and, third, they sought that shareholders’ meetings alternate between Dublin and 
Cork.  Only the second proposal was accepted (and a Mr. Gardner of Craig Gardner   15
appointed), although Shaw conceded that he might not oppose the idea of alternate 
meetings in Dublin ‘when they were not being kicked and cuffed about by some of 
the Dublin shareholders’ (Lambkin, p. 68). 
  In March 1884 the Jackson-led group, increasingly alienated and worried, 
brought suit against directors of the Munster Bank at the Vice Chancellor’s court, 
charging that loans had been made to directors and ex-directors on inadequate 
security. 
  At the next meeting in July 1884, Shaw offered his resignation.  At the same 
meeting, without elaborating much, he announced the transfer of £75,000 from 
reserves to the Bad and Doubtful Debts Account.  The uncertainty affected account-
holders’ confidence and in 1884 deposits fell by £250,000. 
  Then on 20 Nov 1884, Shaw quietly filed a claim for £40,000 in the Court of 
Chancery in London for his services to the Munster since 1884, presumably to 
counter charges of borrowings by him and colleagues.  This did not come to light 
until January 1885. 
  Edmund Dease, a relatively new and inactive board member, was appointed 
to chair the January 1885 shareholders’ meeting, at which Nicholas D. Murphy, a 
Shaw loyalist, tendered his resignation from the board.  That fraught meeting would 
prove to be the bank’s last, in the following months the Munster was in repeated 
contact with the Bank of Ireland about its plight.  But worse was to come.   
  In their very brief report to shareholders at the January 1885 meeting, the 
Directors were ‘glad to be able to announce that subject to the sanction of the 
Court arrangements have been entered into under which the questions under   16
dispute can be determined without any further litigation’.  No such hope.  On 26 
June the legal action of the Dublin shareholders culminated in a judgement 
whereby the defendants to be held liable for advances obtained in contravention to 
Bank’s Articles of Association.  The vice-chancellor, Hedges Eyre Chatterton, 
declared Shaw’s statement to shareholders in January to have been ‘as false a 
statement as ever was made’.  This was the Munster Bank’s death blow. 
  On 2 July a letter to the Bank of Ireland directors signed by three Munster 
Bank directors not directly implicated in the vice-chancellor’s decision (Edmund 
Dease, J.W. Payne, James J. Murphy) stated that the legal proceedings ‘relating to 
the advances to some our directors in the past’ had led to a withdrawal of deposits 
in Munster.  This meant that the Munster Bank was ‘not only unable to reduce our 
account with the Bank of Ireland, as we had fully intended to do at this time, but 
we are under the necessity of applying to you for further assistance’.   
  The letter referred to the puzzling buoyancy of Munster shares, ‘which are 
now being freely bought at largely enhanced prices’.  Apparently there were 
insiders and outsiders among the investing public as well.  Still, Munster Bank shares 
had been falling relative to those of other banks since 1878, with the exception of 
those of the Provincial Bank. 
 
 
THE MUNSTER AND THE BANK OF IRELAND: 
  On Christmas Eve 1884 the Bank of Ireland wrote to the Munster Bank 
expressing concern at the latter’s overdraft with it exceeding the agreed amount.    17
There followed repeated requests from the Munster Bank followed by concessions 
from College Green.  There was much to-ing and fro-ing between Dame Street and 
College Green, with Robert Farquharson, the co-manager in Dame Street, playing 
the lead part for the Munster. The Munster Bank features constantly in the Court 
minutes in the first half of 1885.  In the end the Bank of Ireland gave up.  On 3 July 
it made what would prove its final concession: 
 
Dear Sirs 
In an anxious desire of meeting the severe pressure under which the 
Munster Bank is at this moment labouring the Governors and Directors 
of the Bank of Ireland are prepared to accede to the final request put 
forward by the Munster Bank, in their letter of the 2
nd Inst, and will 
agree to extend, during the pleasure of the Governors and Directors of 
the Bank of Ireland, the amount of the advance made to a total of 
£400,000 on the securities now held (including bills viz. £20,000 as 
offered yesterday).  The Directors of the Munster Bank understanding 
most distinctly that under no circumstances whatever will the amount 
be permitted to exceed the sum above named, viz – Four hundred 
thousand pounds. 
 
On 9 July the Bank of Ireland sent the following: 
 
    Dear Sir, 
As you are well aware the Governors and Directors of the Bank of 
Ireland have had, for some time under their most anxious 
consideration, the condition of the account of the MB.  The Governors 
and Directors observe with deep concern that the overdraft this 
morning stands at £402,802.  This large sum is, you will observe, in 
excess of the outside limit, under all heads, to which the Governors   18
and Directors of the Bank of Ireland were induced to accede – as per 
their letter of the 3
rd Inst.  This outside limit the Governors and 
Directors distinctly stated they would not, under any circumstances, 
permit to be exceeded.  In view of this state of facts it becomes my 
duty to inform you that, unless the overdraft be forthwith be brought 
within the limits prescribed in letter of the 3
rd Inst, I am instructed at 
once, and without further notice, to withdraw from the country the 
various credits allowed under my letter of the 15
th January 1885 and to 
refuse payment of any cheques that may be presented in excess of the 
permitted overdraft. 
The Governors and Directors of the Bank of Ireland deeply regret the 
necessity imposed upon them but they feel that, after all their efforts 
to assist your Bank, under circs of extreme difficulty no other course is 
now open to them. 
 
The court of the Bank of Ireland met almost daily as the crisis worsened.  Its death 
sentence came on 11 July in a letter to J. H. Belton: 
 
Dear Sir 
It is with deepest regret that the Governors and Directors of the Bank 
of Ireland have learnt from the deputation of the Munster Bank at 
their interview today, that your Board were not in a position to put 
before the Governors and Directors of the Bank of Ireland any such 
fresh or satisfactory proposition as they were led hope for from the 
terms of the letter received yesterday from the joint managers in 
Dublin. 
   Thus my Board having lost hope that any further efforts on their part 
to assist the Munster Bank can be eventually successful, and being 
without any substantial ground upon which they are able, with due 
regard to the interests of their own Proprietory, to make any further 
advance, feel compelled to adhere to the conditions expressed in my   19
letters of the 3
rd and 9
th Inst, the former of which, as you are aware, 
laid down distinctly the outside limit to which my Board would, under 
any circs, go, and the latter which with equal distinctness called upon 
your Board at once to bring the overdraft within the stipulated limit.   
It is therefore my duty to inform you that I am instructed to withdraw 
from the several branches of the Bank of Ireland the credits as advised 
in my letter of 19 January 1885 and to state that no cheques of the 
Munster Bank will be honoured which shall be in excess of the limit 
stated. 
 
That was the end, but the Munster did not close its doors immediately.  The value 
of bank stock fell in anticipation.  But did they not plummet?  Either rumours of a 
rescue package kept some hopes high, or else the truth was kept a secret.  On the 
evening of 14 July the Munster closed its doors. 
 
AFTER THE FALL: 
  There were the usual queues and concerned depositors but only one riot, 
which took place outside the tiny branch in Kildysert.  Two days after the bank 
closed its door, at a public meeting presided over by the mayor of Cork Shaw 
contended that he could get the bank back on its feet with a loan of £200,000 in 
London on the Bank’s securities.  A committee was formed to re-establish the bank.  
On the same day the mayor sent telegrams to the city’s two M.P.s, Charles Stuart 
Parnell and Thomas Sexton, requesting that the Irish Party seek government help to 
save the shareholders and depositors. There were calls for the government to place 
pressure on the Bank of Ireland.  Others, however, wanted nothing more to do with 
William Shaw, and called instead for a clean start.       20
  On 21 July 1885 Parnell asked Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer in the House 
of Commons: 
in view of the monetary situation created in Ireland by suspension of 
payment on the part of the Munster Bank, and considering that the 
Bank of Ireland enjoys special facilities under the Law, and 
exceptional advantages from the Government, and has at its disposal 
unused note-issue power to the extent of above a million sterling, 
whether the Government will use its influence to cause the Bank of 
Ireland to assist the Munster Bank to recover its position, and thus 
avoid liquidation, if the different classes of persons interested in this 
Bank as depositors and shareholders should undertake to do their part, 
and the affairs of the Bank should be found in a condition to warrant 
assistance from the Bank of Ireland?  
Parnell too surely shared the suspicion that the demise of its rival suited the Bank 
of Ireland.  At the meeting on the 16th William Shaw had complained that the Bank 
of Ireland’s stance ‘was only in keeping with the attitude which [it] had assumed 
towards them, not yesterday, but for a considerable time’.  The common 
perception—not entirely unjustified—that the Bank of Ireland was a ‘unionist’ bank 
did not help in the circumstances.  Chancellor Sir Michael Hicks-Beach replied 
diplomatically:  
 
The hon. Member has asked me a Question to which I could not give an 
affirmative reply without the risk of raising hopes which, so far as I 
see, could not be realized; but I may say that, in my opinion, the 
exceptional position of the Bank of Ireland entails upon it at times 
such as these special duties, and I have good reason to believe that   21
this is recognized by the Directors of the Bank, and that they are ready 
to help in promoting the very desirable object referred to by the hon. 
Member, so far as may be possible consistently with due regard to the 
safety of the Bank. 
 
  The Bank of Ireland, somewhat rattled by the public outcry, protested to 
Hicks-Beach that it done what it could, and that it was engaged at the time in 
trying to save another bank, the Hibernian.  In a letter to Hicks-Beach on 22 July it 
argued: 
 
The Governor and Board of Directors of the Bank of Ireland, whilst 
admitting the statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer ‘that the 
position of the Bank of Ireland entails upon it at such a time as the 
present exceptional duties’, feel that they can appeal to their action 
in the past years under similar circs as having fully discharged 
whatever these duties may be and that on their present action towards 
the Munster Bank there is also a full recognition of these duties, 
consistent with their first duty to their own Proprietors and the public 
at large. 
 
It included copies of its correspondence with the Munster Bank earlier in the month 
in this letter.  An added ingredient in the complaints against the Bank of Ireland 
was that it motivated by ‘the treacherous desire to grasp at the business of a rival 
concern’ (CE 30 July 1885). 
  The Bank’s balance sheet when it closed its doors is described in Table 1.  At 
first sight, this does not look so bad, but many of the assets were bad debts.  In the 
end £735,000 of its debts were written off, the bulk of which had been incurred in 
Cork (£306,000) and at the Dame St office (£266,000).   22
With the Bank of Ireland refusing to help, talk turned from resuscitation of 
the Munster to the creation of a new bank on the basis of what was good of the old.  
Whence came, within an amazingly short period, the Munster & Leinster Bank.  The 
new bank opened for business on 19 October 1885, beginning cautiously with its 
premises in Cork and Dublin and in nine other places. More branches were opened 
in the following months, on the basis of their having been profitable in their 
previous existence. By 1894 the new bank had added four branches to its network 
(Maryborough, Buttevant, Lismore, and Waterford) but had not re-opened Cahir 
(with an estimated 174 Munster Bank depositors), Cashel (52), Clonmel (212), Ennis 
(202), Ennistymon (249), or Queenstown (104), all of which had a rival bank 
presence. It had also added eleven sub-branches and closed four.  The shareholders 
lost all their investments.  ‘One of the saddest circumstances’, wrote the 
liquidators,’ in connection with the Liquidation is the number of Shareholders who 
had invested the savings of years, in some cases of a whole lifetime, in the shares 
of the Bank, and who were rendered by its failure, even irrespective of the 
subsequent call on the shares, absolutely or very nearly penniless, and against 
whom, therefore, any legal proceedings would be fruitless’ (Munster Bank n.d.). 
 
 
Table 1. FINANCIAL POSITION WHEN BANK FAILED ON July 14 1885 
Assets      Liabilities    
Amounts due by 
debtors (secured 
and unsecured) 






£505,530    Current 
accounts 
£704,445 
Premises £100,000    Bank of Ireland  £410,743   23
Defalcations and 
gold robbery 
£89,230    Union Bank of 
London 
£98,006 
         
Total £3,435,430      £2,674.371 





  This paper began with a quick review of the literature on insider or related 
lending. The story of the Munster Bank is a good example of the ‘looting’ 
interpretation.  In Ireland in the 1880s the banking system was such that, as 
Freeman’s Journal quipped tellingly in the wake of the Munster’s collapse, if a bank 
director’s ‘securities are good, then he should be able to borrow elsewhere’ (July 
15 1885). 
  There was an added sting to the tale.  Much of the odium focused on Robert 
Farquharson, manager of the Dame Street branch, who defalcated to the tune of 
nearly £90,000 and absconded on 24 July .  The police traced him to Amiens Street 
railway station, but the scent seems to have evaporated there.  There were alleged 
sightings in Scotland, in Norway and in Spain (where he would be beyond the reach 
of extradition laws), in Amsterdam, and the United States.  Hue and Cry 
discontinued its weekly entry on Farquharson roughly a year after he disappeared.  
The Munster’s liquidators had him declared bankrupt but this yielded them little.  
Their investigations confirmed that Farquharson had been rifling the bank since the 
early 1880s, though on a relatively small scale compared to his final grand theft.   24
  The Farquharson scandal generated a doggerel ballad, ‘A New Song on 
Farquharson and the Munster Bank’, the first verse of which runs (Anon. 1885): 
 
  The stoppage of pay is the talk of the day 
    With every class and rank, 
    And the money they lost through the robber that bossed 
    The great big Munster Bank. 
    No Irishman could pay the plan 
    Of robbing that he did 
    But on Scotland’s shore, we knew before 
    There was many a knavish kid. 
 
  Nobody ended up in jail in the wake of the Munster’s failure, but its 
liquidators had Shaw, Belton, and Nicholas Dan Murphy declared bankrupt.  Shaw 
owed the liquidators £130,000 against securities valued at £41,000 (Irish Times, 16 
Sept 1886).  He owed this money on his own behalf and on behalf of several 
companies of which he was a director.  His main cronies on the board, Nicholas 
Murphy, J. W. McMullan, and J. H. Belton owed sums on behalf of companies of 
which they were co-directors with Shaw.  Some other directors—Perrier, Dease, La 
Touche—seem to have been ‘outsiders’ (or not ‘related’), and it is no coincidence 
that two of these confided in the Dublin shareholders.   
  Shaw’s death and burial in Enniskerry a decade after his bank’s demise 
passed almost unnoticed.  In an obituary in Freeman’s Journal he was described as 
‘Sensible Shaw’ (21/9/1895), but Tony Lambkin said of him that he had ‘become 
reluctant to allow it to be said that he refused loans to his friends’ (p. 74, italics 
added).  That seems a fair depiction of what is dubbed ‘crony capitalism’ today.   25
  Yet a remarkable feature of the story is how little lasting damage the 
collapse of the Munster did to anybody except to the directors and shareholders.  
Subsequent movements in the shares of other banks show that there was no 
contagion and no fear of systematic collapse.  After an admittedly hesitant start, 
within weeks enough promises of support had been garnered from investors, mainly 
in Munster, to enable the registration of a new bank, the Munster & Leinster Bank, 
to replace the old. The new bank, registered on 19 September 1885, prohibited 
directors from holding accounts in it, and was unencumbered by some of the 
baggage accumulated by the Munster Bank in the form of uneconomic branches and 
overstaffing. A smooth transition was guaranteed by the liquidators, who included 
James Jeremiah Murphy, first chairman of the new bank.  
As for the role of the Bank of Ireland, as quasi-central bank and lender of last 
resort, it probably did too much rather than too little in helping the Munster Bank 
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